A Preliminary Note on Pakistan’s Weapon Systems: Chinese Dependence and Combat Limitations

Longstanding rivalry, distrust, and frequent clashes have defined India’s military ties with Pakistan over the years. Beginning immediately with the Partition in 1947, this hostility has developed into four full-scale wars, several border skirmishes, and ongoing acts of terrorism. However, the character of conflict is changing dramatically in the twenty-first century. Information, technology, and strategic complexity now define more than mere deployment of soldiers and exchange of munitions at the borders. Responding to the Pahalgam terror assault, India’s military clash with Pakistan in early 2025 brilliantly captures this changing nature of war.

Long functioning beneath a “nuclear umbrella,” Pakistan’s military policy has depended chiefly on strategic reliance on China. A large share of Pakistan’s defense infrastructure consists of military equipment and weaponry provided by China. This covers air defiance systems like HQ-16 and LY-80, fighter planes like the JF-17 Thunder, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS), such as the Wing Loong series, and many radar and missile systems. China advertises these weapons under the terms of “low cost, high lethality,” although their effectiveness in actual combat settings has come under constant criticism. Often falling short of the standards maintained by developed countries, in these weapons, recent claims surfaced of radar failures, such as in JF-17 Pakistan Air Force aircraft, when missiles fired by them missed intended targets. These changes highlight the truth that success in combat depends on quality, dependability, and operational experience rather than just numerical strength.

For military cooperation, especially in drone warfare, Pakistan has also lately turned to Turkey. Driven not merely by military demands but also by common religious and geopolitical alignments, this collaboration has contributed drones like the Bayraktar TB2 and the recently developed Söğren Tactical Loitering Drone to Pakistan’s arsenal. Designed for surveillance and precise targeting in urban and hilly terrain, the lightweight, high-speed Söğren drone is a low-altitude UAV. Limited explosives allow it to be appropriate not just for surveillance but also as a lingering munition or “suicide drone.” Multiple invasions by such drones in the Punjab and Jammu areas were effectively detected and neutralized by India. The Indian Ministry of Defense verified that Turkish technology was used in the fallen drones.

The answer from India was diverse. It strengthened its anti-drone fighting capacity. Sensitive border regions were covered by systems like BEL’s (Bharat Electronics Limited) “Drone Dome” and innovative jamming technologies created by the Defense Research and Development Organization. These devices essentially rendered drones like the Söğren and Bayraktar mid-air inactive. India also used high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) drones like the American MQ-9 Reaper and the Israeli Heron TP to precisely monitor and mark cross-border drone launch points, which were subsequently targets for surgical strikes.

India has given defense self-reliance, strategic multilateral relationships, and precision-based planning top priority in its security philosophy, unlike Pakistan’s approach. Modern AESA radars, long-range Meteor air-to-air missiles, and robust electronic warfare systems equip the sophisticated fighter aircraft, such as the Su-30mki and the French-origin Rafale that the Indian Air Force has. India has also sent Heron and MQ-9 Reaper drones on recent missions to target terrorist hideouts precisely. Used in these missions, the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile excels in speed and accuracy above any missile weapon Pakistan has at its disposal.

A key component of these operations was India’s emphasis on Pakistan’s communication infrastructure, radar networks, and drone control systems in addition to physical targets. Using their directionless and inoperable electronic warfare teams of the DRDO and Indian Air Force effectively blocked Chinese-origin communication networks utilized by Pakistan. This means that contemporary warfare now spans completely the fields of cyber and electronic battle, transcending land, air, or sea. The military standoff of 2025 exposed South Asia as a multifarious laboratory for global armaments supply networks, political manipulation, and technology superiority rather than just a battleground for traditional combat. Countries like China and Turkey actively influence Pakistan’s strategic orientations, not only by providing weapons.

Nevertheless, the most important lesson from this fight is India’s capacity not just to resist the combined efforts of these outside players but also to acquire a strategic upper hand firmly. Anchored in indigenous weapon manufacture, sensible use of international partnerships, and multi-level combat preparedness, India’s self-reliant defense policy has shown that modern warfare is not only a contest of brute strength but also of technology, intelligence, and strategy. The debris from the Söğren drone was not just symbolic; it also provided a specific technical challenge to India’s security sovereignty, one India fully addressed. It is evidence of India’s changing strategic perspective, which is now predictive and forceful rather than reactive. India has to keep its technical advantage in the following years and make sure that nations like Pakistan do not compromise regional peace by depending on other forces and neglecting international military rules. This will call for a triad of strategic knowledge, diplomatic wilfulness, and defensive self-sufficiency. Clearly, the 2025 confrontation shows India is headed in the right direction.

Harsh Pandey is a PhD Candidate at the School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi