China’s ‘Visit Nepal Year 2025’: Tourism Drive or Geopolitical Strategy?

China’s announcement of Visit Nepal Year 2025, intended to commemorate 70 years of diplomatic ties between the two nations, has been framed as a goodwill gesture aimed at strengthening cultural relations, boosting tourism, and fostering people-to-people connections. But beneath the surface of this seemingly celebratory campaign lies a far more complex interplay of geopolitics, economic ambition, and strategic maneuvering.

While Nepal is undeniably rich in natural beauty and sacred Buddhist sites, it has never been a top destination for Chinese outbound tourists, who generally prefer countries like Thailand, South Korea, Japan, and the Maldives. The decision to spotlight Nepal in 2025 raises important questions—why now?

The answer appears to lie not in tourism preferences but in strategic necessity. China’s investments in Nepal, particularly in large-scale infrastructure projects like the Pokhara International Airport (PIA) and Gautam Buddha International Airport, have yet to yield expected results. Built with Chinese loans and constructed by state-owned companies, these airports remain underutilized and have drawn criticism for design flaws, poor execution, and lack of commercial viability.

PIA, built at a cost of $216 million, is a prime example. Opened in 2023, it has seen only a trickle of international traffic—just seven foreign flights by early 2024, six of which were operated by China’s Sichuan Airlines. Questions about the airport’s functionality, corruption during construction, and limited night-landing capabilities have led critics to label it a “white elephant.” The push for Visit Nepal Year 2025 seems designed to retroactively justify such investments by stimulating demand.

Beyond reviving infrastructure, the initiative appears aimed at expanding China’s economic footprint in Nepal—particularly in tourism, hospitality, and retail. In Kathmandu’s Thamel district alone, the number of Chinese-owned restaurants and businesses has surged, with over 150 Chinese eateries operating by 2022. Chinese entrepreneurs have registered more than 350 businesses in Nepal, many of which utilize payment platforms like WeChat Pay and Alipay, creating closed-loop systems that often bypass Nepal’s formal economy and taxation structures. This growing dominance has increasingly sidelined local businesses, raising concerns over unfair competition and regulatory oversight.

China’s campaign also emphasizes deeper cultural exchange. But this, too, has brought unintended consequences. Nepal’s security agencies have flagged a spike in unlawful activities linked to Chinese nationals. Between 2013 and 2021, nearly half of the 3,130 foreigners deported from Nepal for illegal activities were Chinese. Offenses have ranged from cybercrime to unregistered businesses, with growing concerns that Nepal is being used as a gateway for unauthorized movement into India—exploiting the open border and straining regional security.

Economically, Nepal does benefit from Chinese tourism. The sector contributes around 6.7% to the national GDP and is expected to generate nearly $500 million in 2025. However, the gains remain largely limited to Chinese-operated businesses due to self-contained tour packages and limited engagement with Nepalese service providers. This structure restricts broader economic participation and poses long-term risks by anchoring tourism to a single dominant market.

Strategically, Visit Nepal Year 2025 also functions as a subtle challenge to India’s traditional influence in Nepal. India has historically been Nepal’s largest investor and closest cultural partner, supported by shared history, open borders, and deep-rooted people-to-people ties. China’s rediscovery of sites like Lumbini—Buddha’s birthplace—and its framing of BRI-linked infrastructure as part of a grand connectivity vision can be interpreted as soft power moves aimed at reshaping the regional narrative.

Yet, Nepal’s official stance has been cautious. Despite hosting BRI projects like PIA, the country has not formally endorsed the initiative’s broader strategic framework. This disconnect underscores the difference between Chinese projection and Nepal’s internal priorities.

Ultimately, Visit Nepal Year 2025 is more than a tourism campaign—it is a multi-dimensional strategy. While Chinese tourists may offer short-term economic benefits, the initiative also serves as a mechanism for China to salvage underperforming projects, deepen economic dependence, and assert its geopolitical presence in South Asia.

For Nepal, the challenge is to engage with such initiatives without compromising its sovereignty or economic autonomy. As tourism becomes a new arena in the contest for regional influence, Nepal must tread carefully, ensuring that any partnership—no matter how lucrative—aligns with its long-term national interest.

Harsh Pandey is a PhD candidate at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.